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Abstract
This paper argues that the adoption of an inflation target reduces the persistence of inflation.
We develop the theoretical literature on inflation persistence by introducing a Taylor rule for
monetary policy into a model of persistence and showing that inflation targets reduce
inflation persistence.  We investigate changes in the time series properties of inflation in
seven countries that introduced inflation targets in the late 1980s or early 1990s.  We find that
the persistence of inflation is greatly reduced or eliminated following the introduction of
inflation targets.
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11. INTRODUCTION
This paper argues that the persistence of inflation is lower when there is an
inflation target. This implies that inflation is more responsive to monetary policy when
inflation is the main focus of policy.
The idea that inflation persistence may depend on macroeconomic institutions or
policy regimes, of which inflation targets are a recent example, is well established in the
literature. Alogoskoufis and Smith (1991) and Alogoskoufis (1992) argue that inflation is
less persistent with fixed exchange rates.  Other authors, for example Siklos (1999) and
Burdekin and Siklos (1999), argue that other factors, such as wars, supply shocks or
Central Bank reforms, also affect persistence.
We extend the theoretical literature by introducing a Taylor-rule representation of
monetary policy (Taylor, 1993) into an otherwise standard model of inflation persistence,
similar to Taylor (1979), Alogoskoufis and Smith (1991), Agenor and Taylor (1992) and
Alogoskoufis (1992).  We show that inflation persistence is affected by the parameters of
the monetary policy rule.  An increased weight on the price-level target in the monetary
policy rule reduces persistence.  As a result, persistence is lower when there is an inflation
target.
We test our model by investigating changes in the time series properties of
inflation persistence in seven countries that adopted inflation in the late 1980s or early
1990s (Australia, Canada, Finland, New Zealand, Spain, Sweden and the UK).  We find
that the persistence of inflation is greatly reduced or even eliminated following the
introduction of inflation targets.   Using annual data we cannot reject the hypothesis that
inflation persistence has been eliminated in any country.  Using quarterly data, we can
only reject this hypothesis for the UK.
The paper is structured as follows.  Section 2) contains our theoretical model.
Section 3) contains our empirical results.  Section 4) summarises and concludes.
2. THE MODEL
2In this section we present our model.  We begin by considering aggregate demand.  We then
develop the supply side of the model before finally analysing inflation persistence.
2a) Aggregate Demand
We assume that aggregate demand is given by
 (1) 1 1 1( )t t t t t ty y i E p E p vg - + -= - - + +
where y is the natural logarithm of output, y is an exogenous component of demand, i  is
the nominal interest rate, p is the natural logarithm of the price level, 1 1t tE p- +  is the
expected price level in period (t+1) using information available at time t-1, tv  is a white
noise demand shock and t indexes time.   We assume that monetary policy is conducted
through an interest rate Taylor-type rule,
(2) )()( *** yyppii ttt -+-+= yf
where i* is a constant, p* is the log of the policymaker's target for the price level and y* is
the log of the policymakers target level of output. The policy parameters f and y describe
the responsiveness of nominal interest rates to deviations of inflation and output from their
respective targets.  Our model extends the literature by introducing a familiar Taylor rule
description of monetary policy (Taylor, 1993).  In the existing literature, Taylor (1979)
assumes aggregate demand depends on the real money supply and that the nominal money
supply is proportional to the price level.  Alogoskoufis and Smith (1991), Agenor and
Taylor (1992) and Alogoskoufis (1992) have an aggregate demand relationship similar to
(1), but model interest rates using a money demand equation and again assume the
nominal money supply is proportional to the price level.  In essence, these models are
equivalent to y=p*=y*=0 in (2).
The introduction of a Taylor rule allows us to analyse various policy regimes.  If
f®¥ and y®0, the over-riding priority of monetary policy is to achieve a price level of
pt*.  This is equivalent to an inflation target of pt*, where pt*=pt*+pt-1.  If y®¥ and f®0,
3there is an output target. If y=f, there is a target for nominal GDP.   The parameters of the
Taylor rule affect the extent to which monetary policy accommodates inflation.  With an
inflation target, policy does not accommodate inflation as real interest rates increase
whenever inflation rises above the target. With an output target, changes in the price level
do not change the real interest rate and so monetary policy fully accommodates inflation.
Substituting (2) into (1), we can summarise aggregate demand as
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where { ( * * *)}/(1 )cy y i p yg f y gy= - - - + . The slope of this aggregate demand curve
depends on the policy regime. The curve is horizontal if there is an inflation target, is
vertical if there is an output target and has a conventional negative slope if there is no
target (see also, Taylor, 1999a).
2b) Aggregate Supply
We use a standard model of aggregate supply.  We assume there are a large number
of identical monopolistically competitive firms.  Each firm’s technology is described by a
simple production function,
(4) jt jt ty a x= + +l ,
where l  is employment, x is a supply shock, a is a constant and j indexes the firm. We
follow the literature (eg. Alogoskoufis, 1992 and Bleaney, 2001) in assuming that the
supply shock follows a random walk, 1t t tdxx x e-= + + .  The demand for each firm
depends positively on aggregate demand and negatively on its relative price:
(5) )( ppyy jttjt --= h
4where ty  is given by (3)  From a standard profit maximisation problem and using
equations (4) and (5), the price chosen by each firm is:
(6) jt jt tp wm a x= + - -
where jw  is the nominal wage and
1)/11( --= hm  is the mark-up of price over marginal
cost in firm j.
We assume that wage adjustment is staggered and described by a discrete time,
Calvo-type utility-maximising wage contract model, (Calvo, 1983). At any given time, the
wage at each firm has a fixed probability d of being adjusted to a new value of wˆ, and a
fixed probability, (1-d), of remaining fixed at the previous period’s wage.  The aggregate
wage is given by the sum of all wage contracts still in force. With (1 )sd d-  being the
fraction of wage contracts adjusted s periods before t, the aggregate wage is given by:
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The wage chosen when adjustment occurs is forward-looking:
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where *tw  is the optimal wage common to all union that adjust their wage contracts in
period t.  We assume that this is given by,
(9) * * *1 1( )t t t t tw E p E y yw s- -= + + -
5where w* is desired real wage growth (assumed constant for simplicity), *y  is a reference
level of output and s measures the elasticity of real wages with respect to output.
Equation (9) can be derived from almost any model of wage formation.
We then use (8) to express wage contracts in terms of wt and use (6) to express wt
in terms of prices.  This gives the following equation for the aggregate price level,
(10)
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where ˆ (1/(1 ) ) 0d d d b= - - >  and increasing in d . Defining inflation as 1t t tp pp -= -
and taking expectations, we can summarise the supply side of our model as
(11)
* *
1 1 1 1
2
1 1 1 1
ˆ ˆ( ) ( )
1 (1 )
1
t t t t t t
t t t t t
E E E y y
E E
p b p d w m a ds
d b
x x b x
d
- - + -
- - - +
= + + - + -
æ ö+ -
+ - +ç ÷-è ø
This aggregate supply or Phillips curve is similar to others in the literature (e.g Taylor, 1999b,
Mankiw, 2000 or Holden and Driscoll, 2001).
2c) Inflation Persistence
We substitute the aggregate demand curve, equation (3), into the aggregate supply curve,
equation (11), to obtain
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Forming expectations and rearranging equation (12) we obtain,
(13)
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.    Equation (13) can be written as
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where 1l  and 2l  are the smaller and larger roots respectively of (14), L is the lag operator
and F is the forward operator.   Expressing (14) as
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substituting (15) into (12) and then taking first differences, we obtain
(16) 1 11 1 12 2
1 1
(1 ) (1 )
1
1 1 1 (1 ) 1 (1 )t t t t
dx
l b l q d d
p l p e e
ql ql b d b d- -
æ ö- -
= + + - -ç ÷- - + - + -è ø
where 
7(17)  
2 2
1
2
1 1 (1 ) (1 ) 4 (1 )ˆ 1 1 1
(1 )2 (1 ) 1 ˆ1 (1 ) (1 ) (1 )
1
b d gs f q d
l d
gs fq d gy b d d d
gy
æ ö
ç ÷æ öæ ö+ - + -ç ÷= - - - -ç ÷ç ÷ +- + ç ÷è øè ø + - - - -ç ÷+è ø
From (17), we can show (see appendix for details)
(18) 1 10; 0
d d
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Equations (16)-(18) comprise our model of the persistence of inflation.  We find that the
parameters of a Taylor rule for monetary policy affect the persistence of inflation
(although the targets p* and y* do not).  Inflation is less persistent when policymakers
place a greater emphasis on the price level or a lesser emphasis on output.  We therefore
predict that inflation will be less persistent with an inflation target.
3) Empirical Evidence
In this section we present evidence on how the persistence of inflation is affected
by inflation targeting.  We consider those OECD economies that adopted inflation targets
in the late 1980s or early 1990s, namely New Zealand (adopted inflation targeting in
1989Q3), Australia (1993Q2), Canada (1991Q1), Sweden (1993Q1) and the UK
(1992Q3).  We also consider Finland and Spain, which adopted inflation targets (in
19932Q1 and 1994Q1, respectively) but abandoned these upon entering EMU in 1998Q2
(see Bernanke at al, 1999 for further institutional details).  We use the consumer price
index to measure prices throughout and use both annual and quarterly data to ensure our
findings are robust.
We first examine the time series properties of our data, testing for unit roots.  For
our quarterly data, we test for seasonal unit roots, using the HEGY test (Hylleberg t al,
1990). The HEGY test identifies the precise nature of seasonal integration and allows us to
8model any seasonal unit roots accordingly.  The following auxiliary regression is
undertaken:
(19) tttttt zzzzzL eppppj ++++= ---- 1,342,331,221,114)(
where å
=
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1)( jj  is a stationary autoregressive polynomial of order n in L.
Deterministic variables are left out of the equation for simplicity but are included in the
empirical estimates.  The z-variables are given by:
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where p is the log of consumer prices. One-period lags of the dependent variable are
included in the tests.
The results of the HEGY tests are presented in Table 1).  The null hypotheses of
02 =p , and 043 =Çpp  are rejected at the 5%-level for all countries, implying the
absence of semiannual, complex and annual unit roots.  However, the null hypothesis of
01 =p  cannot be rejected at the 5%-level for any of the countries.  This suggests that
consumer prices in quarterly data contain a zero-frequency unit root and therefore that
first-differences is the appropriate filter for making the series stationary.   We examined
the time series properties of our annual data using simple ADF tests.  We found that prices
were clearly I(1) in each country (the results are not presented to save space, but are
available from the authors on request).  We therefore define the rate of inflation using both
annual and quarterly data as pt = pt-pt-1, where p is the log of the consumer price index.
To examine the impact of inflation targets on inflation persistence, we consider
simple regression models of the form
9(20) pt = a + (b1 + b2FXt + b3 ITt ) pt-1  + ut
where FX is an indicator variable that equals unity during periods of fixed exchange rates
and equals zero in other periods; IT is an indicator variable that equals unity during
periods where an inflation target was in operation and equals zero in other periods and u is
an error term. We use the White (1980) procedure to correct our estimated standard errors
for heteroskedasticity and the Newey-West (1987) estimator to adjust standard errors for
serial correlation.
Equation (20) is similar to other models in the literature on inflation persistence.
These models typically interact lagged inflation with indicators of institutional presence or
economic events.  For example, Alogoskoufis and Smith (1991), Alogoskoufis (1992) and
Bleaney (2001) use indicators of fixed exchange rates, corresponding to b3=0 i  (20).
Other authors, egBurdekin and Siklos (1999) also include indicators of other events, for
example oil shocks and structural changes at Central Banks.
Estimates of (20) are presented in table 2).  In every country, the estimate of b3 is
negative and significantly different from zero using both annual and quarterly data. Indeed,
we can only reject the hypothesis that inflation targets have eliminated inflation
persistence (H0: b1+b3=0) in the case of the UK using quarterly data and cannot reject the
hypothesis for any country when using annual data.  These finding provide strong evidence
in favour of our hypothesis that adopting an inflation target will reduce the persistence of
inflation. The only other evidence on this is in Siklo (1999), who finds more ambiguous
results using data up to 1997 (this may be because we have more observations from the
inflation targeting regime).
The impact of exchange rate regimes on inflation persistence is less clear.  We find
a significantly lower rate of persistence during fixed exchange rates for Spain and the UK,
which is consistent with Alogoskoufis and Smith (1991) and Alogoskoufis (1992), but no
consistent significant effect in Australia, New Zealand, Finland and Sweden.  This is
broadly consistent with the results in B rdekin and Siklos (1999), who argue that wars, oil
shocks or changes in Central Bank statutes have at least as great an impact on inflation
persistence as exchange rates regimes.
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We investigated the robustness of these findings in several ways (the results of
these lengthy experiments are not reported but are available from the authors).  First, we
used alternative measures of inflation.  We estimated (20) where inflation was defined as
pt=p t-p t-2 and pt=p t-pt-4.  We found broadly similar results; in particular, we continued to
find large and significant reduction in inflation following the introduction of an inflation
target.  Second, we estimated an augmented model that allowed the intercept to vary
between policy regimes, to allow for changes in the equilibrium inflation rate between
regimes (Bleaney, 2001).  We continued to find that the persistence of inflation was lower
when there was an inflation target, although there was an effect on estimates for the fixed
exchange rate regime, similar to B eaney (2001).  Third, we included the measures of oil
shocks and changes in Central Bank statutes that were identified as significant by
Burdekin and Siklos (1999) and Siklos (1999).  We again continued to find that the
adoption of inflation targets lead to a reduction in inflation persistence, although most our
estimates again became less well determined.  Fourth, we assessed the importance of
mispecification apparent in the estimates in Table 2).  Such mispecification is not
surprising as we estimate a very simple model; similar findings are reported in the
literature (g Burdekin and Siklos, 1999).  Our use of the White (1980) and Newey-West
(1987) corrections should ensure that our estimates are robust to this.   We found we could
eliminate mispecification by including more lags of the dependent variable and by
including dummies for time periods associated with marked volatility.  We again
continued to find that inflation targets are associated with less inflation persistence.  Fifth,
we estimated the model pt = at + btpt-1  + ut  using both Kalman Filter and rolling window
techniques.  Although our estimates were not as precise as those reported in Table 2, we
continued to find that inflation persistence was lower in the 1990s than in the preceding
two decades.   Overall, therefore, it seems that our conclusions are robust.
Finally, we summarise our findings by presenting estimates of the pooled model
(21) pit = a + (b1 + b2FXit + b3 ITit ) pit-1  + ut
where i indexes the country and t indexes time.  Our estimates, presented in Table 3,
confirm the results of the country-by-country estimates in Table 2.  The introduction of
11
inflation targets leads to a large reduction in the persistence of inflation.  Using annual
data, the persistence of inflation fell from 0.54 to 0.16 following the introduction of
inflation targets.  We cannot reject the hypothesis that the persistence of inflation was
eliminated.  Using quarterly data, the persistence of inflation falls from 0.62 to 0.21,
although in this case we can reject the hypothesis that inflation persistence is eliminated.
4) Conclusion
This paper has argued the persistence of inflation is lower when there is an finflation
target, so inflation is more responsive to monetary policy when inflation is the main focus
of policy.  We presented a model in which inflation targeting reduces inflation persistence
by reducing the extent to which monetary policy accommodates inflation.  We then
presented evidence from seven countries that adopted inflation targets in the late 1980s-
early 1990s.  We showed that the persistence of inflation did indeed fall sharply after the
introduction of an inflation target.
Inflation targets are a relatively recent innovation in monetary policy.  Over time, as
data accumulates, it will become possible to analyse the impact of inflation targets in
greater detail, investigating different aspects such as the choice of a target value as
opposed to a target range, or different definitions of inflation to be targeted.  We intend to
consider these issues in future work
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Table 1)
HEGY unit root tests
)ˆ( 1pt   )ˆ( 2pt   )ˆ,ˆ( 43 ppF
Canada -3.31 -7.91 38.17
Australia -2.45 -4.75 42.93
New Zeal. -2.07 -6.49 47.42
Finland -1.22 -5.32 55.33
Spain -1.71 -5.42 50.91
Sweden -2.30 -5.91 55.37
UK -2.07 -5.44 36.95
A time-trend, constant term, seasonal dummies and a lagged dependent variable are
included in the estimates.  Estimation period:  1946.Q2-2001.Q2, which yields 220
observations. Critical values for T = 200 at the 5% level are (see Hyll berg et al, 1990:
)( 1pt  = -3.49, )( 2pt  = -2.91, and ),( 43 ppF  = 6.57.
Table 2)
 Parameter estimates of inflation persistence
pt = a + (b1 + b2FXt + b3 ITt ) pt-1  + ut
(a) quarterly data
sample 1945Q1-2001Q2
b1 b2 b3 DW 2R HET RES SC Ho:(b1=b3)
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Canada 0.69(13.0) -0.40(5.10) -0.56(3.60) 2.17 0.46 4.79 1.19 1.41 0.79
Australia 0.65(9.15)  0.03(0.44) -0.47(2.68) 2.42 0.49 19.5 0.58 2.61 1.71
New Zeal. 0.57(3.83)  0.14(0.95) -0.40(2.44) 2.25 0.48 21.4 1.51 1.15 2.48
Finland 0.51(6.18) -0.06(0.46) -0.76(3.19) 2.29 0.26 18.2 1.41 3.24 2.11
Spain 0.61(9.16) -0.31(3.49) -0.79(4.41) 2.25 0.42 19.2 0.20 2.38 0.61
Sweden 0.37(4.83) -0.05(0.49) -0.43(3.25) 2.21 0.21 12.7 0.40 2.46 0.11
UK 0.68(6.09) -0.42(3.30) -0.30(2.06) 2.20 0.55 63.3 0.18 1.22 7.32
(b) annual data
sample 1946-2001
b1 b2 b3 DW 2R HET RES SC Ho:(b1=b3)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Canada 0.88(5.38) -0.45(3.14) -0.57(2.34) 1.85 0.52 6.64 1.14 0.20
Australia 0.79(11.1) -0.19(0.99) -0.50(2.06) 1.71 0.54 11.4 0.14 1.32
New Zeal. 0.77(10.0) -0.12(0.91) -0.54(2.71) 2.10 0.54 6.84 1.13 1.24
Finland 0.63(4.32) -0.34(1.86) -1.90(2.93) 2.01 0.41 8.78 1.55 3.35
Spain 0.72(10.3) -0.24(1.83) -0.63(3.42) 1.77 0.54 3.42 0.22 0.17
Sweden 0.68(7.48) -0.28(2.93) -0.68(2.64) 1.99 0.47 1.14 1.40 0.00
UK 0.77(8.46) -0.44(3.16) -0.50(3.34) 1.77 0.68 15.1 0.14 2.34
Notes: The numbers in parentheses are absolute t-statistics.  Constants and seasonal dummies are included in the
estimates but not shown.  The t-values are based on White’s eteroscedasticity consistent covariance matrix.
Estimation period: 1946.Q2-2001.Q2. DW = Durbin-Watson test for first order serial correlation, HET =
Breusch-Pagan LM test for heteroscedasticity, and is distributed as )6(2c  under the null hypothesis of no
heteroscedasticity, RES is Ramsey’s RESET test with the predicted value squared as additional regres or, and is
distributed as F(1,213) under the null hypothesis of no functional form problems, and SC is a LM test for 1-4
order serial correlation and is distributed as t(217) under the null hypothesis of no 1-4 order serial correlation.
Ho:(b1=b3) is a test of the null hypothesis b1=b3.  It is distributed as 
2(1)c  under the null
Table 3)
Pooled parameter estimates of inflation persistence
pit = a + (b1 + b2FXit + b3 ITit ) pit-1  + ut
(a) quarterly data
sample 1945Q1-2001Q2
b1 b2 b3 DW 2R Ho:(b1=b3)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
0.62(27.0) -0.22(6.70) -0.41(4.85) 2.15 0.64 6.08
__________________________________________________________________________________
(b) annual data
sample 1946-2001
b1 b2 b3 DW 2R Ho:(b1=b3)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
0.54(1501) -0.39(6.17) -0.38(2.48) 1.96 0.62 1.05
see notes to table 2)
Additional Notes: R2 is based on Buse’s raw-moment R2.
1Appendix
Derivation of equation (18)
From equation (17) and using the definitions of 1 2l l  and 1 2l l+ , we can show that
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 and so inflation targeting
reduces inflation persistence.
Conversely, we can show that the effect of output stabilisation on inflation
persistence is positive,
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Since for convergence the small root of the dynamic equation is required to be less
than unit 11 <l  then 01 1 >+- fl  and so given 12 ll >  for any value of 1<d ,
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